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Although theory suggests the possibility that sufficient factor market 
imperfections might result in a “reversal”  of  exports and imports, the 
evidence from the country studies indicates that in none of them did this 
occur for HOS trade, except in cases of  regional trading arrangements. 
This finding is itself significant, in that it suggests that one can be fairly 
confident that adopting a genuinely export-oriented trade strategy will 
not lead to perverse results and that there is no potential conflict between 
employment and real output objectives involved in the choice of  a trade 
strategy. 
That reversals did not take place, however, does not imply that factor 
market imperfections are nonexistent or insignificant. Theory does not 
show that reversals must occur or even that they are likely; it does suggest 
that, in the presence of  distortions, observed proportions and product 
mixes will differ from what they would be in their absence. 
Important questions therefore remain: How sizable are factor market 
distortions? How great is their influence upon factor proportions within 
industries? What is the effect of  product and factor market distortions 
upon the output mix? And to what extent would the employment implica- 
tions of  alternative trade strategies differ quantitatively in the absence of 
those imperfections? Would the potential for additional employment 
through choice of  trade strategy greatly increase in the absence of  im- 
perfections?  Or, on the contrary, are they either sufficiently small in 
magnitude or unimportant enough so that their removal would hardly 
affect the orders of magnitude reported in chapters 5 and 6? What sorts of 
policies to implement the choice of trade strategy are likely to increase 
the demand for labor or to adversely affect it? Are they integral parts of 
the trade regime or unnecessary appendages? 
The questions are inherently difficult to  tackle empirically. No “perfect 
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market” has ever been observed. Information costs, frictions associated 
with the process of  economic growth, transaction costs, and other phe- 
nomena  are all reasons why  complete uniformity of  rates of  return, 
wages, and prices will never be observed in all markets-nor  should they 
be, in the presence of costs of adjustments. This implies that a first, and 
difficult, empirical task is to distinguish the components of  observed 
differentials.  More fundamentally, however, there are always market 
imperfections, and they  differ only in scope and magnitude.  A fun- 
damental question is when those imperfections become sufficiently great 
so that they significantly affect the functioning of markets and the nature 
of  responses to market signals. 
Little is known  about the probable  orders of  magnitude  of  factor 
market imperfections and their consequences. Given the complexity of 
the analysis, that is hardly surprising. We could not hope that the NBER 
project would result in definitive quantitative estimates as answers to 
these  questions,  in  light  of  the  paucity  of  data  and  prior  analysis. 
Nonetheless, a number of  pieces of  evidence have emerged. It is the 
purpose  of  this chapter  to evaluate the findings as  to the orders of 
magnitude of  distortions in the project countries. 
Although the focus of the entire project was on employment creation, 
the fact that imperfections in both the labor and the capital markets can 
affect the relative  profitability of  alternative techniques  implies that 
capital and labor market imperfections must both be examined in assess- 
ing distortions. In this chapter, therefore, the effects of both capital and 
labor market  distortions are evaluated in  terms of  their effect upon 
relative costs of employing capital and labor. It remains to chapter 8 to 
evaluate the effects of  those differentials and of product market distor- 
tions on labor coefficients. 
Section 7.1 undertakes some necessary preliminary analysis, examin- 
ing types of capital market distortions and their probable effects on costs 
of  using capital and labor. Section 7.2 then provides evidence about the 
magnitude of factor cost distortions. Section 7.3 contains an estimate of 
the quantitative effects of these distortions on the wagehental ratio. In 
section 7.4 these estimates are used to indicate the probable order of 
magnitude of  the effect on the wagehental  ratio.  It will  remain  for 
chapter 8 to consider the effect of  these cost differences upon factor 
proportions,  and their influence upon the implications of  alternative 
trade strategies for employment. 
7.1  Analysis of  Capital Market Distortions 
In addition to the possible effect of labor market distortions, discussed 
in chapter 2, on the relative costs of  employing labor and capital, there 
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affected, thereby affecting the relative attractiveness of  different tech- 
niques and the relative costs of more and less capital-intensive industries. 
First, the trade regime itself may be administered in ways that affect the 
relative costs of capital equipment to different users. Second, there may 
be credit rationing that can affect the relative costs of labor and capital to 
different industries.  Finally, the tax structure can  affect the relative 
profitability of labor-intensive and capital-intensive techniques. Each of 
these three influences on the cost of capital is discussed in this section in 
turn. 
7.1.1  Trade Regime and Costs of  Capital Equipment 
A variety of mechanisms have been identified, especially under import 
substitution regimes, through which the trade regimes may affect the cost 
of employing capital relative to the cost of employing labor,' and also the 
relative cost of capital to different activities.' Of these, the most visible is 
generally the preferential exchange rate generally granted to capital- 
equipment imports, especially under import substitution. 
Many of  the issues pertaining  to capital market  distortions can be 
analyzed in the context of one of the simplest mechanisms that can lead to 
a distortion: use of  a different (and lower) effective exchange rate for 
imports of machinery and equipment than for other imports. Very often 
this arises in the context of  currency overvaluation, when most imports 
are subject to high tariff rates while capital goods imports enter at low 
rates of duty or even duty-free. Consider first the case where all capital 
goods are imported and have no domestically produced substitutes. If 
capital goods imports are permitted at an overvalued exchange rate, 
while imports of other types of goods are either prohibited or else subject 
to a much higher effective price of  foreign exchange, it is evident that 
purchasers of imported capital equipment will pay a lower price for that 
equipment than they would in the absence of  the distortion. 
Analysis of the effects of this policy, however, can be undertaken only 
after a mechanism is specified for determining the overall volume of 
imported capital equipment. To demonstrate this, it is sufficient to recog- 
nize that if  all who wished to do so at the prevailing (subsidized) price 
were free to import capital equipment, the volume of imports of  capital 
goods and equipment would be greater than it would have been at a 
nondistortionary price. The net effect would be a larger stock of  capital 
equipment  than  would  otherwise  have  been  the  case:  presumably, 
domestic consumption would be smaller than it would have been in the 
absence of  the distortion, while investment would be greater.3 In this 
circumstance the effects of the distortion would be upon present relative 
to future consumption levels: a market-determined outcome would wit- 
ness more  present,  and  less future, consumption. There would  not, 
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sense that all users of imported machinery and equipment would face the 
same (distorted) price. 
However, few observers of  import regimes in developing countries 
believe that the volume of  imports of  capital goods is above optimal 
levels. When the exchange rate is overvalued and imports of  capital 
goods are permitted at a lower EER than other commodities, the more 
usual situation is that the demand for foreign exchange for this and other 
purposes exceeds the supply. As a consequence, the authorities generally 
employ some sort of rationing mechanism to determine who is permitted 
to import how much at the implicitly subsidized rate. It is the rationing 
mechanism combined with the implicit subsidy received by those entitled 
to import that determines the precise nature of  the distortion and its 
effects on capital costs as perceived by individual entrepreneurs. 
A number of  rationing mechanisms have been used, and their effects 
on capital costs differ. Among the prominent ones are: (1) designating 
“priority” industries and sectors eligible to import at the favored ex- 
change rate; (2) determining which investment projects are to be permit- 
ted, subject to an overall budget constraint for imported capital goods; 
and (3) scaling down applications for licenses to import capital goods. 
Where “priority” industries and sectors are permitted relatively free 
access to imports of capital goods, the cost of capital services to firms in 
those sectors is less than it is to firms in other sectors of  the economy. 
Excluded  firms confront higher capital costs than  they would in the 
absence of  distortion. 
The way the second mechanism would work hinges crucially on how 
investment projects are screened for approval. On one hand, if individual 
businessmen perceive that the probability of  approval of  their applica- 
tions for imports of capital goods is independent of the capital intensity of 
their projects, the net effect on resource allocation will be similar to that 
of the first mechanism: those projects approved and permitted to import 
capital goods will be more capital intensive than if  a market-clearing price 
were to be charged (although, by hypothesis, the market-clearing price 
would presumably be above that which would prevail in the absence of 
exchange rate overvaluation, since total foreign exchange earnings would 
be less than with a higher, less overvalued, real EER). On the other 
hand, if  applicants  believe that  the probability  of  approval  of  their 
applications hinges upon the capital intensity of the project, the outcome 
may differ. In the extreme case, if  the authorities shadow price capital 
and labor correctly to ensure full employment and equate marginal rates 
of  substitution of  capital for labor in all lines, then the outcome with 
project evaluation should not differ from that of  an efficient auction 
market  for the available supply of  foreign exchange, except that  all 
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sidies equal to the value of their licenses, and the total volume of imports 
would, of  course, be smaller than at full equilibri~m.~ 
To  be sure, this “perfect shadow pricing” mechanism is unlikely to be 
experienced in practice, but considering it points up the polar extreme 
from the first case and the fact that there are two distinct effects of 
exchange rate overvaluation upon capital costs and differentials in them. 
On one hand, because foreign exchange earnings are smaller, one would 
generally expect that imports of capital goods would be fewer and that the 
cost of  capital perceived by the average firm would be higher than with 
greater foreign exchange availability. On the other hand, because licens- 
ing mechanisms for imports are necessarily imperfect, there is likely to be 
misallocation of the given capital stock. With “perfect shadow pricing,” 
marginal rates of substitution would be equated across all activities, and 
importers of capital equipment would receive the equivalent of lump-sum 
subsidies, which would not affect their behavior. At the other extreme, 
the entire value of the implicit subsidies can be absorbed in the utilization 
of  above-optimal capital intensity in the production process (or in pro- 
ducing very capital-intensive goods). 
One  particular form of allocating import rights has fairly readily identi- 
fiable effects on capital costs. That is, in their efforts to be “fair,” the 
authorities establish criteria for import license allocation. Those criteria 
are often based on such phenomena as shares of  existing capacity or 
shares of  output that provide  a formula  for license allocation.  Such 
formulas, when announced, differentially affect capital costs, since build- 
ing new capaFity or other actions in effect become part of  the cost of 
obtaining import  license^.^ 
The third mechanism, scaling down applications for licenses to import 
capital goods, is in many regards a cross between the first two methods. 
However, the effects on costs depend upon how many firms, industries, 
and sectors are eligible to apply for importing machinery and equipment, 
and also upon applicants’ expectations about the mechanism by which 
scaling down  will  be  accomplished.  If  licenses are issued for value 
amounts of  imported machinery and equipment, incentives will differ 
from those provided when licenses are issued for imports of  specified 
types of  machinery and equipment. In the former case, receipt  of  a 
license to import a specified value of  capital goods imposes a budget 
constraint upon the recipient so that he may, if  the license value repre- 
sents less than  the quantity desired  at the prevailing exchange rate, 
choose labor-using and capital-saving techniques. If, on the other hand, 
the license is awarded for the importation of  a specified type of  auto- 
mated loom or other capital-intensive equipment, the incentive to econo- 
mize on use of  imported capital goods is vastly different. 
Under any of  the three mechanisms, the effects of  the implicit capital 124  Chapter Seven 
subsidy must be analyzed in two parts: (1) the effect of  the rationing 
mechanism upon choice of technique in the sectors eligible for it, and (2) 
the effect on sectors that are utilizing less capital-intensive techniques 
than they would use under optimal resource allocation (given the existing 
pattern of  output). 
In Argentina and the project countries in which there seemed to be 
implicit or explicit subsidization of capital goods imports by means of  an 
overvalued exchange rate-Chile,  Pakistan,  Thailand  to a moderate 
extent, Tunisia, and Uruguay-the  recipient sector seems to have been 
the large-scale urban industrial sector, which was also the sector encour- 
aged by tariffs and trade barriers to produce import substitution goods.6 
The losing sectors of  the economy appear to have been the informal, or 
small-scale, urban sector and the agricultural-rural sectors. The orders of 
magnitude of  the implicit subsidy to imported capital equipment are 
discussed in section 7.2. 
So far the discussion has been couched in terms of import substitution 
regimes in economies where all capital goods must be imported. In fact, 
construction is usually a home good,'  and, in addition, in countries where 
import substitution has been adopted policy for a period of years, some 
types of capital goods are domestically produced. In those circumstances 
there is a secondary set of  effects emanating from the trade regime: on 
one hand, implicit subsidization of capital goods imports encourages, as 
before, techniques of  greater-than-optimal capital intensity among the 
recipients  of  import licenses; on the other hand,  the authorities fre- 
quently prohibit the import of  goods competing with domestic produc- 
tion.  ' 
This latter may 'offset in part the implicit subsidy to capital goods if 
import-license recipients are required to buy some parts of their plant and 
equipment from domestic suppliers. Since, by hypothesis of protection, 
domestic equipment is generally priced above world-market levels and 
accorded protection by  the trade regime (in greater amount than the 
implicit negative protection  associated with the overvalued exchange 
rate), the net effect on incentives to substitute capital for labor can be 
fairly complex. Whether the increased cost of  domestically produced 
equipment exceeds or falls short of  the reduced cost of  the imported 
equipment will determine the net effect on the cost of  investment goods. 
In this latter connection, there are significant questions about the degree 
of  substitutability between imported and domestic capital equipment.* 
There are also questions about which kinds of  investment  are most 
affected, since the range of  capital goods produced may be limited.' 
For individuals and firms unable to obtain import licenses, the effect of 
protecting domestic capital goods producers probably tends, on net, to 
raise the relative cost of  employing capital.'" Whether the group denied 
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economy is not certain: it may also include firms within the organized 
sector. 
In conclusion, implicit subsidization of  imports of  capital equipment 
can have different effects on the cost of using capital for those receiving 
import permits, depending on the allocation mechanism, the extent to 
which domestic capital goods industries are protected, the range of such 
goods, and the fraction of  the investment package that domestic goods 
constitute. Implicit subsidization of import of capital goods for one group 
normally entails relatively high capital costs for those individuals and 
sectors of the economy denied access to imported capital goods. Import 
substitution regimes have in general tended through this mechanism to 
favor firms in the large-scale, organized sector of the economy. It may be 
that the implicit subsidy tends to offset the higher costs of production of 
those goods entailed by their comparative disadvantage. Nonetheless, it 
can constitute an implicit subsidy both for capital-using industries and for 
choice of  capital-intensive techniques. 
7.1.2  Credit Rationing and Domestic Capital Market Imperfections 
In attempting to pinpoint markets in LDCs whose imperfect function- 
ing may be empirically important in affecting resource allocation and 
growth, many observers have focused upon financial, credit, and equity 
markets.  An oversimplified characterization would entail the following 
ingredients: a fragmented or virtually nonexistent equity market so that 
most private firms are family enterprises; government restrictions upon 
the banking system, and in particular upon permissible interest rates, so 
that excess demand for loans prevails and financial instjtutions somehow 
ration credit among their customers; and the absence of  a market for 
long-term borrowing and lending. 
The combination  of  inadequate or nonexistent  equity markets and 
nonavailability of long-term loans would, by itself, entail significant costs. 
For, even if  the banking system were otherwise functioning smoothly 
with positive real rates of interest and loans available to all who applied,” 
entrepreneurs might be reluctant to resort to short-term borrowing for 
financing  long-term investments. Conversely, if potential borrowers were 
constrained in their equity positions by the size of  family assets, banks 
might well be reluctant to lend large amounts in the short term. Insofar as 
this combination of  circumstances implies that each enterprise will ex- 
pand at a rate dictated largely by its own available funds, in turn gener- 
ated by its own resources, each firm has its own supply curve for capital 
and different costs of  capital. 
Governments in developing countries have responded to these phe- 
nomena in financial markets in a variety of ways: in some cases monetary 
reforms have been undertaken to liberalize the credit markets and induce 
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other cases governments have used the absence of  these markets as a 
rationale for introducing “selective credit allocation,” under which gov- 
ernment-owned or government-regulated  institutions  allocate  credit , 
both short-term and long-term, according to various  riter ria.'^ In these 
circumstances the interest rate charged on loans is well below market- 
clearing levels and below what bank and other financial institutions would 
charge if  unregulated. Often, rates are even considerably below the rate 
of inflation. 
When this form of  intervention is employed, the consequent credit 
rationing can have a significant effect upon individual firms’ costs, de- 
pending on the ways loanable funds are allocated. 
Two issues must be considered. First, there are a number of  mecha- 
nisms within the domestic credit markets that can significantly affect the 
cost of  capital among individual industries and firms. Second, govern- 
ments have used credit-allocation mechanisms to channef resources into 
directions they  deemed  desirable. Those  directions have  often been 
closely associated with the choice of trade strategy, and the interaction of 
trade strategy and the domestic credit market in affecting  the cost of using 
capital relative to labor may be substantial. 
Turning first to domestic factors, the mechanisms for allocating credit, 
often with an implicit subsidy element at negative real interest rates, can 
have a significant and differential effect on capital/labor costs in different 
industries. This is especially the case in countries where government- 
owned or government-controlled  institutions are the chief lenders. In 
countries where the preponderance of  investment consists of  imported 
capital goods, there is, or can be, considerable scope for choosing be- 
tween credit mechanisms and import licensing mechanisms as a means of 
attempting to control the direction of  investment. Because of  this, the 
analysis of credit rationing and its effects on capital costs is very similar to 
the analysis of  import licensing and its effects. 
In particular, if credit applications are evaluated and decided upon 
without regard to the choice of techniques involved in a particular invest- 
ment project, firms will view the prevailing interest rate as their cost of 
borrowing.  If, on the other hand, all investors are entitled  to some 
financing at subsidized rates but must obtain some financing at realistic 
curb rates,  the effects may  be quite different. In South Korea, for 
example, it appears that almost all enterprises are eligible to obtain a 
fixed fraction of their financing, at implicitly subsidized interest rates, 
well below the expected rate of  inflation. They then resort to the curb 
market for the remaining portion of their financing, paying positive real 
rates of interest 5-15  percent above the rate of  inflation. To the extent 
that the financing formula is known and invariant with respect to the size 
of the potential investment project, the “true” interest rate confronting 
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subsidized interest loans times the borrowing rate and the remainder 
times the curb rate. 
If, on the other hand, projects are divisible and precise expansion plans 
need not be submitted or carried out, the curb rate may truly be the 
marginal cost of borrowing. For in that circumstance much of the implicit 
subsidy entailed in receipt of  a loan at below market-clearing rates is 
precisely that: choice of a more labor-intensive technique results in saving 
on borrowing at the curb rate of  interest. 
Figure 7.1 illustrates the various possibilities. In case I, the official 
borrowing rate is r,, and all firms are eligible for two-thirds of their loan 
applications at that rate. Meanwhile, the curb rate of interset is r,, and 
one-third of  all borrowing is financed at curb rates. In that instance the 
actual lending rate firms face is r,,  equal to two-thirds times r, and 
one-third times r,.  If  firms all have access to the subsidized credit and 
know the proportions in which they will receive it, they will base their 
investment decisions on r,.  To the extent that all do so, no distortion 
results in the allocation of capital across potential borrowers, providing 
all are eligible to receive the same fraction at a subsidized rate. 
In case 11, r, and r, are as in case I,  but the authorities finance some loan 
applications and not others. Thus there may be two classes of  firms. 
Those with an investment schedule such as MECl are ineligible for, or 
denied, subsidized loans. They therefore resort to curb financing entirely, 
borrowing oZl  at interest rate r,. Firms in the second group, represented 
by MEC,, receive full financing of  their projects at subsidized interest 
rates, in amount  01,.  In this case the distortion is obvious: there are 
opportunities for investment  at rates of  return above r, that are not 
undertaken  by  firms in the first category, while the rate of  return on 
investment is r, for firms in the second category. 
The third case is one in which firms receive loans in amounts  01,  but are 
then free to vary the amount they borrow in the curb market at rate of 
interest orl.  As drawn, curb market lending would be lol.  In that instance 
the rectangular area rlabro represents a pure lump-sum subsidy to the 
borrowers. If  all borrowers receive such a subsidy and nonetheless bor- 
row additional sums in the curb market, they all face the same marginal 
cost of  capital on that account. Only if  some borrowers do not find it 
profitable  to resort  to curb-market financing will  capital costs differ 
between users. 
In most countries, elements of  all three cases undoubtedly arise. In 
South Korea the amount financed at official rates is sufficiently large (see 
section 7.2.8) that it seems probable that some borrowers are excluded 
from eligibility (as in case 11)  and that others regard the true cost of 
borrowing as in case I. In Thailand and Pakistan the large-scale enter- 
prises were the main borrowers at official interest rates, so that case I1 
seems to be a better characterization  of  the capital market effects of 128  Chapter Seven 
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credit rationing. In Brazil the fraction of  investment financed by  low- 
interest loans was sufficiently small (see section 7.2.2) that case I11 may 
be the best approximation. 
There remains the question how any or all of the three credit rationing 
mechanisms interact with  the choice of  trade strategy.  One obvious 
mechanism is when the designated priority industries eligible for subsi- 
dized credit are associated with choice of  trade strategy. This has often 
been the case. In import substitution countries, the planning authorities 
have frequently drawn up lists of  industries they wished to encourage, 
and available credit has been channeled to those industries.  Even in 
export promotion countries, special financing facilities are often available 
to exporters. This mechanism was certainly an important feature of the 
South Korean export promotion strategy, and it is one Hong pinpoints as 
having led to resource misallocation and overly capital-intensive tech- 
niques within the Korean economy. In addition, the availability of  low- 
cost capital services could, at least in principle, enable some relatively 
capital-intensive industries to export despite the absence of comparative 
advantage. The empirical importance of  these elements is evaluated in 
section 7.2. 
7.1.3  Taxes and Their Incentive Effect on Capital Costs 
By and large, analysis of  the effect of tax incentives on factor propor- 
tions is straightforward. The most frequently encountered set of  taxes 
was upon labor: social security taxes and other measures substantially 
increased the costs of  hiring labor. The evidence on this is reviewed 
below, and little needs to be said here except that, to the extent that taxes 
on labor are imposed  on one sector of  the economy only, the wage 
confronting that sector is higher than elsewhere, and incentives for use of 
techniques with greater capital intensity than would otherwise be the case 
will prevail for that ~ector.’~  In general this appears to have been true for 
many of  the project countries. 
Several other types of  taxes (or tax exemptions to encourage certain 
activities) can  also influence choice of  techniques. Perhaps the most 
notable for the project countries concerns tax holidays granted to firms in 
designated  (generally “priority”) industries. Because tax holidays are 
granted to nonlabor returns only, these measures, which are generally 
intended to encourage the development of particular industries without 
regard to the choice of  techniques within them, nonetheless increase 
incentives for use of  capital-intensive techniques.I5 
By contrast, sales tax exemptions of the type used extensively by Brazil 
do not appear to have significant effects on factor proportions. Although 
the Brazilian tax structure discriminated in favor of  sales in the foreign 
market, there appears to have been little bias introduced by it into the 
choice of  techniques by individual firms. 130  Chapter Seven 
7.2  Magnitude of Factor Cost Distortions 
In this section the orders of magnitude of factor market distortions in 
the project countries are reviewed in light of the analysis of labor markets 
in chapter 2 and of capital costs in section 7.1  .16 As will be seen, the nature 
and extent of distortions differed considerably among the project coun- 
tries. Hong Kong is not covered, since all the evidence indicates that the 
labor and capital markets are comparatively distortion-free. 
7.2.1  Argentina 
Argentina seems to have had all the types of differential capital costs 
discussed above and also to have had a number of factors raising the cost 
of  employing labor. 
The trade regime itself affected the cost of  employing capital equip- 
ment, in that the exchange rate was overvalued and in that investors able 
to obtain licenses to import capital goods received an implicit subsidy of 
about 40 percent. Simultaneously, Argentina’s import substitution had 
proceeded far enough so that, by the late 1960s, there was a substantial 
domestic industry producing capital goods. According to Nogues’s esti- 
mates (1980), about 68 percent of  investment in tradable capital goods 
was supplied from domestic sources. The domestic producers were pro- 
tected with nominal rates of protection of 97 percent for machinery and 
109 percent for transport equipment. Nogues was unable to estimate the 
differential allocation of  licenses to import capital goods across indus- 
tries, but  he  conjectured that public enterprises and firms in  import 
substitution sectors currently being encouraged by industrial promotion 
laws received preferential access to licenses. On average, he estimated 
that the trade regime increased the price of capital goods about 8 percent 
above what it would be at free trade. 
Domestic policies also influenced the cost of employing capital goods. 
Argentina encouraged the development of  new import substitution in- 
dustries by industrial promotion  laws. Industries, enterprises, and re- 
gions benefiting from these laws were eligible for tax and tariff exemption 
and for credit at preferential interest rates. Tax holidays and deferrals 
(the latter being very valuable in a high-inflation country) were accorded 
to them. Nogues estimated that in the early  1970s eligible investors 
received a subsidy of  about 40 percent of their capital costs through the 
fiscal mechanisms. Simultaneously, the subsidy of  element implicit in 
negative  real  rates  of  interest was  probably  about 66 percent for  a 
ten-year loan. Although only 14 percent of  manufacturing investment 
was financed through these loans, the distribution among manufacturing 
sectors implied significant differences in costs of  capital. On average, 
financial subsidies probably reduced capital costs in manufacturing by 
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Government intervention in Argentine labor markets has also been an 
important influence on the relative costs of labor and capital. During the 
period Nogues covered, the government established a minimum wage for 
unskilled labor. These wages were probably binding for much of  the 
large-scale manufacturing sector. In addition, charges for old-age retire- 
ment plans, a family allowance fund, and other legislated labor benefits 
undoubtedly contained a sizable element of tax. Nogues estimated that, 
on average, these taxes added about 15 percent to labor costs (above the 
effects of  minimum wage legislation). The differential in  labor costs 
between firms observing all government regulations and those evading all 
of  them could have been as much as 40 percent. 
7.2.2  Brazil 
As was seen in table 3.3, Brazil’s structure of  effective protection 
discriminated in favor of  capital goods during the import substitution 
period in the late 1950s. While the average effective rate of  protection 
was 242 percent for consumer goods, it was 65 pecent for intermediate 
goods and 53 percent for capital goods. Since the exchange rate was 
considerably overvalued at that time, this probably led to a substantially 
greater incentive to use capital-intensive techniques than would have 
been optimal, especially since virtually all capital goods were imported 
during that period. 
During the 1960s, the tariff reform substantially unified effective rates 
of protection, as is reflected in table 3.3.  Thus, during the import substitu- 
tion period, the structure of  protection and the tendency to exempt 
capital goods imports from the restrictions surrounding other commod- 
ities probably resulted in a lower-than-optimal price of capital goods for 
those favored enough to be able to import. With the switch to an export 
promotion strategy, the discrimination in favor of capital afforded by the 
exchange rate largely disappeared, but it was partially replaced by the 
availability of  implicitly subsidized credit  .I7 
There  were  virtually  no  financial institutions  providing  access  to 
medium- or long-term credit until 1964. At that time, the Banco Nacional 
de Desenvolvimento Econ6mico (BNDE) began lending for medium and 
long periods at fairly low rates of interest, usually under 5 percent in real 
terms. This compared with a real rate of  return on capital during the 
period of about 12 percent annually. For 1965 to 1974, Carvalho and 
Haddad calculated that the implicit subsidy entailed in  BNDE loans 
ranged from 10 to 50 percent of the value of the loan, with an average of 
about 20 percent depending on the time period  of  the loan and the 
repayment schedule. BNDE covered an average of about 60 to  70 percent 
of the cost of  capital goods in projects they financed, the rest being 
financed through credit at market rates of interest. The implicit subsidy 
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BNDE loans. For recipients of such loans, therefore, the subsidy element 
was sizable. However, for most manufacturing sectors of the economy, 
the share of  total investment financed by  BNDE loans was relatively 
small: except for metal products, where 55 percent of  investment was 
financed by BNDE loans, shares were less than 15 percent. 
Although this suggests that the total value of the subsidy implicit in the 
BNDE loans was probably about 3-4  percent for the manufacturing 
sector as a whole, it is apparent that the ways credit was rationed led to 
different prices of capital to different users, and even to different capital 
costs of  different projects for individual firms. Thus the discriminatory 
effects of  credit rationing may have been marked. 
It is perhaps noteworthy that the sectors financing the largest fraction 
of  their investment from BNDE funds over the period 1967-69-metal 
products (55 percent), transport equipment (14 percent), and machinery 
and electrical equipment  (12 percent)-were  also among the sectors 
whose exports bulked large in the export drive of the late 1960s. In 1970, 
output of the metallurgy sector constituted 20 percent of  manufactured 
exports, machinery and electrical equipment 14 percent, and transport 
equipment 4  percent. To  what extent BNDE channeled its loanable funds 
toward export sectors or activities in support of  the export promotion 
strategy is not known. What is clear is that the loans constituted a sizable 
subsidy to the recipients, and that their effects were clearly discrimina- 
tory within and between sectors. 
There are also numerous phenomena in Brazil that affect labor costs. 
For example, provisions and restrictions concerning employee working 
conditions and compensation on night shifts have made multiple-shift 
operations more costly than they would otherwise be. There are also 
regulations affecting firms’ ability to lay off or discharge workers. How- 
ever, Carvalho and Haddad chose to focus upon two sets of government 
regulations in the labor market that are, in their judgment, potentially 
the largest source of  labor market distortion. 
First, they examined the effect of minimum wage regulations, which, if 
effective, would have had the largest influence upon  employment of 
unskilled labor. In fact, examination of  the data suggests that, over the 
late 1960s and early 1970s at any event, inflation was sufficiently rapid so 
that increases in the legal minimum wage were not effective: the real 
minimum wage was approximately constant over the period, while aver- 
age real wages rose about 20 percent. Moreover, a very large fraction of 
workers earned considerably more than the minimum wage: in 1972,44 
percent of  all workers earned more than 3.7 times the minimum wage, 
contrasted with only 14  percent in 1968. Although minimum wage legisla- 
tion may have raised the cost of  hiring unskilled workers in the mid- 
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However, a second form of  distortion raising labor costs increased in 
importance during the 1960s and the 1970s: social security taxes. To be 
sure, if all firms are subject to the same rate of social security tax, then, in 
an otherwise perfectly functioning labor market, employee compensa- 
tion would be relatively unaffected, with smaller take-home pay  and 
higher fringe benefits (including, of  course, the right to social security). 
Welfare losses would arise only to the extent that employees preferred 
greater pay in the present and less provision for retirement, or that the 
government was inefficient either in tax collection or in investment of the 
proceeds as contrasted with private firms offering pension rights. In fact, 
however, two circumstances served in Brazil to increase distortions: on 
one hand, not all firms were subject to the same legal rate of tax; on the 
other hand, there is a presumption that small-scale firms and activities in 
the informal sector (including self-employment) did not pay the tax. 
The average rate of social security tax, as a proportion of  wages, was 
7.9 percent in 1945 and rose thereafter to a rate of 43.9 percent in 1971. It 
may have risen still further at later dates. In contrast to legal rates, the 
actual average paid for all manufacturing activities in 1970 was 27 per- 
cent, with some two-digit industries paying an effective rate of  22.8 
percent and others paying as much as 29.7 percent. 
The existence of the social security tax raised the cost of hiring labor to 
firms covered by it relative to the cost of labor to uncovered activities and 
also discriminated between manufacturing sectors on the basis of the rate 
of  tax paid. 
7.2.3  Chile 
Corbo and Meller focused upon the effect of distortions introduced by 
the trade regime on the relative price of investment goods in Chile in the 
late  1960s. At that time, of  course, the regime was oriented toward 
import  substitution.  However, there were  no  significant quantitative 
restrictions upon the import of investment goods, so that an estimate of 
the price distortion can be obtained by evaluating the degree to which the 
exchange rate was overvalued and to which the structure of  protection 
favored import of capital equipment. 
Using the estimated equilibrium exchange rate derived by Taylor and 
Bacha (1973), which was 30 percent above the official rate, and the ratio 
of the average effective exchange rate to that for capital goods (1.0543), 
Corbo and Meller estimated that with uniform pricing of all tradables the 
relative price of  imported capital equipment would have been about 37 
percent  higher  than  it  in fact was.  Since importation was  permitted 
without strict licensing, this estimate can be taken as indicative of  the 
underpricing of  (nonconstruction) investment goods attributable to the 
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Corbo and Meller did not examine the effects, if  any, of credit ration- 
ing, the tax structure, or labor market imperfections on the relative cost 
of  using labor and capital. 
7.2.4  Colombia 
Thoumi’s focus was on the early 1970s, by  which time there was a 
crawling-peg exchange-rate system and overvaluation of the currency, if 
any, seems to have been fairly minimal. As was seen in table 3.3, the 
effective protection rate for imports of capital goods, 80 percent, was well 
above the 33 percent rate for consumer goods and the 15 percent rate for 
intermediate goods in 1969. It thus appears that, during the period on 
which Thoumi focused, Colombia’s moderately  export-oriented trade 
regime did not contain a significant identifiable distortion in the pricing of 
capital goods imports.I8 
Likewise, although there was strong minimum wage legislation and 
were fairly strict regulations on conditions under which workers could be 
laid off or terminated in the 1960s, by the 1970s the effect of the minimum 
wage legislation was much less, and other regulations had a considerably 
smaller effect on the labor market than was the case earlier. For Colom- 
bia, however, data on the characteristics of  the labor force were not 
available with which to attempt to assess the remaining effects of  these 
provi~ions.’~ 
Thus, like Brazil, Colombia apparently had fairly strong incentives to 
use capital-intensive production methods in the 1960s, but these distor- 
tions  were  substantially  reduced  with  the  switch  toward  an  export 
orientation in the 1970s. 
7.2.5  Indonesia 
There can be little doubt that, during the period of heavy emphasis on 
import substitution in the late 1950s and early 1960s, extreme overvalua- 
tion of the currency provided a strong incentive for using imported capital 
goods for those fortunate enough to obtain import licenses. With the 
reform of the trade regime in the late 1960s, however, this incentive was 
largely removed, both because the exchange rate was more realistically 
valued and because quantitative restrictions upon imports were largely 
removed. However, the structure of  effective protection in Indonesia 
continued to provide a degree of  discrimination in favor of  imported 
capital equipment and against other imports. Pitt’s estimates of ERPs for 
1971 indicate  that  they  were  as low  as 5.3 percent for nonelectrical 
machinery,  16.3 percent for electrical machinery, and 3.5 percent for 
railroad equipment. This compared with an average rate of 65 percent for 
all importables, and rates as high as 217 percent for radio, television, and 
communications equipment and 204 percent for motorcycles and bicy- 
cles. By the mid-l970s, outside the period covered by Pitt’s work, credit 
subsidies, duty exemptions, and tax holidays for new investment further 
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Creation of  new (productive) employment opportunities is an urgent 
policy problem in Indonesia because of the relatively rapid growth of the 
labor force.  Until  recently there have been  few impediments to the 
functioning  of  the labor market.  Minimum wage legislation was not 
enacted until 1975. Over the period covered by Pitt, he states that the 
available evidence indicates that “wage determination occurs in an undis- 
torted labor market.” (Pitt 1981, p. 193). 
7.2.6  Ivory Coast 
The Ivorian  trade regime was  generally outward-oriented and the 
exchange rate was fairly realistic during the period covered by Monson’s 
data. The Ivorian case provides an interesting illustration of the ways the 
trade regime and other instruments of  policy can be linked. A major 
instrument for encouraging economic activity, especially in the modern 
sector of the Ivorian economy, was the institution of a special legal status, 
priority firms, for activities so designated by the government. Firms with 
priority status were eligible for a number of special privileges that made 
the use of  capital-intensive techniques cheaper than it would otherwise 
have been. 
Significant interaction with the trade regime occurred in that (1) firms 
engaging in activities the government wished to encourage (exporting 
output from the modern sector, import substitution in consumer goods) 
were granted priority status, thereby using the domestic policy instru- 
ment to encourage favored trade activities; and (2) firms receiving prior- 
ity status were generally granted greater protection by the trade regime 
than firms with common-law status. Thus, 78 percent of  domestic value 
added in HOS exportable industries was produced by firms with priority 
status; 79  percent was the corresponding figure for import-competing 
HOS goods. The average rate of  effective protection received by firms 
producing exportables with priority status was 58 percent, compared with 
only 9 percent received by common-law firms. Similarly, the average 
effective protection rate for priority import substitution firms was 105 
percent, while common-law firms received an average of  62 percent.” 
In addition to receiving greater protection, priority firms were gener- 
ally subject to lower tax rates and also lower costs of  borrowing. These 
circumstances were reflected in differences in costs for various categories 
of  activities as reflected in the following ratios given by Monson:z’ 
Taxes to  Interest Payments 
Gross Profits  to Debt 
HOS exportables  .059  .049 
HOS protected importables  .197  .067 
All modern activities  .305  .038 
Priority firms  .179  .038 
All manufacturing firms  .307  .033 136  Chapter Seven 
The real interest  rate was not negative: inflation in the Ivory  Coast 
averaged only about 3 percent annually in the 1960s and early 1970s. 
HOS-protected importables therefore paid an average real rate of  in- 
terest of close to 4  percent, while the average manufacturing firm paid a 
real rate of interest of  close to zero on borrowed funds. It appears that, 
for the  Ivory  Coast  at least,  differences in tax  rates were probably 
quantitatively more important than differences in interest rates in deter- 
mining after-tax profits. 
One other aspect of  the interaction between the trade regime and 
priority-firm privileges is of interest. That is, priority-firm status was used 
as an inducement to foreign investors. To some extent, greater capital 
intensity of foreign firms may be attributable, in the Ivorian situation, to 
the fact that their incentives to use capital-intensive techniques were 
greater than were the incentives offered to domestic firms. 
The labor market also has a number of distinctive features that render 
an analysis of  the degree of  distortion particularly difficult. The Ivory 
Coast has higher real wages than neighboring countries, and it permits 
immigration from them. Simultaneously, many managerial and profes- 
sional jobs are held by non-Africans, so that the wage structure at both 
the upper and lower ends of the wage and salary distribution is affected by 
supply conditions. 
Monson identified the principal labor market distortion as arising from 
the system of minimum wages-separately  established for different cate- 
gories of  workers-combined with the imposition of  social insurance 
taxes equaling about 40 percent of  base wages. For most categories of 
workers except the unskilled, actual wages were above the set minimum 
levels by a sufficient margin so that there is a strong presumption that the 
legislation was ineffective. For unskilled workers, however, the mini- 
mum wage plus social insurance charges on it exceeded the average wage 
(not subject to social insurance charges) in the informal sector by about 
23 percent in the early 1970s. Since Ivorian workers in the unskilled 
categories had higher average wages than the migrant Africans in the 
same category, there is a presumption that, on one hand, the minimum 
wage legislation may have discouraged employment of  African migrants 
and, on the other hand, that employers may have been able to hire those 
workers without paying social insurance charges. The average wage paid 
for unskilled migrant Africans was 8.7 thousand FCFA per month in 
1971, compared with a minimum wage (not including the social insur- 
ance) of  10.1-11.5  thousand FCFA per month. 
7.2.7  Pakistan 
Guisinger’s analysis of  the effect of  government policies upon capital 
costs pertains to the early to mid-l960s, a period during which policy was 
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ence represents another example of interaction between the trade regime 
and domestic policies. On one hand, licenses to import capital goods 
carried a large scarcity premium and were allocated by the government to 
“priority” industries. These latter were generally large-scale manufactur- 
ing firms that generally were using more capital-intensive techniques than 
smaller firms within the same industries.  Thus the scarcity premium 
emanating from an overvalued exchange rate was used as an instrument 
of  policy to induce economic activity in desired lines. On the other hand, 
desiderata emanating from the trade status of various industries clearly 
influenced which industries and sectors were to receive priority designa- 
tion. On average, it appears that firms engaged in import substitution 
activities were more likely to be accorded priority status than were their 
export-producing counterparts. 
For the fiscal year 1959-60,  Guisinger estimates that the equilibrium 
exchange rate was probably about Rs. 7.6  per dollar compared with an 
official rate of Rs 4.76. This amounted to about a 38 percent reduction in 
the cost of imported capital equipment as contrasted with a uniform rate. 
As can be seen from table 3.3,  this discrimination through exchange-rate 
overvaluation was not significantly enhanced by low effective tariffs: in 
general, the effective tariffs on imported capital goods were relatively 
high,  although  exemptions  and  tariff  reductions  were  once  again 
accorded to priority firms, since each individual package was somewhat 
different from the others. 
In addition to licensing of  capital goods imports at  an overvalued 
exchange rate, Pakistan had both tax measures and credit policies that 
further accentuated the degree to which users were faced with artificially 
low costs of  capital equipment. Guisinger calculated the implicit value of 
these measures in 1959-60 to those fortunate enough to receive subsi- 
dized credit and tax privileges, on the simplifying assumption that interest 
payments were not subject to profits tax.2z  In Pakistan, firms able to 
secure loans were able to borrow at 5.74 percent. This contrasts with 
Guisinger’s estimate that  a realistic rate would  have  been  about 15 
percent. In the absence of  any currency overvaluation, annual interest 
costs at 15 percent to finance an imported machine costing $21 abroad 
would have been Rs. 24. With a loan at 5.74  percent, this cost would have 
been reduced to Rs. 9.16. If, in addition, the importer could obtain the 
machine at the overvalued exchange rate, his carrying cost would decline 
to Rs. 5.7.  Thus, overvaluation of the currency directly reduced user cost 
by 38 percent; artificially low interest charges alone would have reduced 
user costs by about 53 percent; the combination of overvaluation of  the 
currency and low interest rates reduced user costs by 66 percent. 
In addition, Guisinger calculated the value of accelerated depreciation 
provisions applied to  taxes of favored firms in Pakistan. This measure was 
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firms. This is because  accelerated  depreciation  provisions are worth 
nothing during the period of a tax holiday, and a tax holiday is worth less 
the higher the rate of permitted accelerated depreciation. Even so, had 
the exchange rate not been overvalued and had a realistic rate of interest 
been  charged  on  borrowing,  accelerated  depreciation-permitting 
equipment to be written off  over three years rather than over its eco- 
nomic life of  sixteen years-would  have reduced annual user cost by 45 
percent. In the presence of  credit rationing and overvaluation of  the 
exchange rate, however, the incremental reduction in user cost was about 
20 percent. Adding a tax holiday yielded a further small reduction in user 
cost. Taken all together, the subsidized exchange rate for capital goods 
imports, the availability of subsidized credit, provisions for tax holidays, 
and accelerated depreciation reduced annual user cost of imported capi- 
tal equipment in Pakistan in 1959-60  by  about 75 percent. Stated the 
other way around, eliminating these provisions would have increased the 
cost of  capital virtually 300 percent. While these calculations represent 
orders of magnitude only, they are nonetheless indicative of the extent to 
which trade policies and domestic market interventions can interact to 
create large differentials between socially desirable policies and private 
incentives. 
Guisinger proceeded to use estimates of  the degree of  currency over- 
valuation, interest rates, and tax schedules to estimate a time series of the 
ratio of the equilibrium rental rate on capital to the actual rate, where the 
equilibrium rate was defined as that which would have existed in the 
absence of  those measures. According to his estimates, the ratio of  the 
equilibrium rental to the market rental of capital stood at 3.62 in 1959-60 
and rose as high as 4.34 in 1966-67. Thereafter it fell somewhat but still 
remained at 3.68 in 1971-72. With the Pakistani devaluation of  1972, the 
ratio dropped sharply to 1.27, where it remained until the end of his time 
series in 1974-75. 
In Pakistan, large-scale firms generally had access to import licenses, 
credit at implicitly subsidized interest rates, and tax advantages. Small- 
scale firms were much more often forced to resort to the market, paying 
curb-market rates for their loans and buying domestic capital equipment 
or bonus vouchers to be able to import their equipment. Thus it appears 
that large-scale firms had an incentive to be substantially more capital- 
using than small-scale firms. 
In contrast to the capital market until the 1970s, the Pakistani labor 
market  appears to have been fairly distortion-free. Although  a large 
informal sector coexisted side by side with large-scale industry and gov- 
ernment employment, the available data, though fragmentary, do not 
suggest that workers with comparable characteristics had different earn- 
ings in the two sectors. Trade unions do not appear to have constituted a 
significant factor in wage determination, and real wages in the urban 139  The Extent of  Factor Market Distortions 
sector seem to  have been influenced largely by shifts in supply (emanating 
partly from rising real wages in agriculture) and demand (reflecting in 
part the changing skill composition of  the labor force), at least until the 
early 1970s. 
In the early 1970s this situation may have begun to change, as the 
government began imposing minimum wage regulation  and raising its 
own pay scales substantially. In 1971  and early 1972, for example, annual 
bonuses were made compulsory, and other fringe benefits (including 
profit sharing, life insurance, and medical benefits) were also mandated. 
Thus, for the period covered by  Guisinger’s analysis of  labor coef- 
ficients in various trade categories, Pakistan, like Indonesia (and South 
Korea), can probably best be regarded as having had fairly distortion-free 
labor markets. Whether the same conclusion would be valid at present is 
rather doubtful. 
7.2.8  South Korea 
Labor unions are not powerful in South Korea, and the government 
has not imposed any minimum wage or other regulations that significantly 
affected the determination of working conditions and remuneration dur- 
ing the course of the export-oriented strategy. To be sure, real wages rose 
dramatically, but this appears to have been the outcome of market forces 
with capital accumulation and rapidly rising demand for labor in the 
urban sector. Any distortions in the relative costs of  using labor and 
capital lay in the capital market. 
With her export orientation of  the 1960s and 1970s, South Korea’s 
exchange rat6 was fairly realistic, and there was little implicit subsidiza- 
tion of the use of capital goods through that route. However, a variety of 
policies designed to encourage exports had the side effect of  rendering 
the purchase of  imported  capital goods relatively cheap for  Korean 
exporters. Exporters were always permitted to import capital equipment 
duty-free for the production of exports. Over 70 percent of investment in 
machinery  and equipment  consisted of  imported  capital goods.  The 
average rate of  duties actually collected on imported machinery and 
equipment was generally about 5 percent, reflecting the predominance of 
exporters among investors and their tariff exemptions. Insofar as firms in 
a particular country are competing with firms overseas for international 
markets, it is arguable whether duties on capital equipment would or 
would not constitute a form of negative effective protection to the export 
industry. However, what is clear is that, compared with firms producing 
goods for the domestic market, exporters eligible for duty-free import of 
capital goods will have relatively lower cost of imported capital  It 
should be noted that all foreign investment projects in South Korea were 
also eligible for duty-free import of  capital goods after 1960. 
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in 1960), exporters were always entitled to a higher depreciation allow- 
ance on their tax returns than were other firms. The magnitude of  the 
increased allowance, and also its coverage, increased greatly in the 1970s. 
Another major instrument used by  the government to encourage ex- 
ports was the allocation of  credit, at below-market interest  rates, to 
exporters. Hong estimates that the real rate of  interest paid by  those 
receiving credit allocations was 8 percent in 1962-66, 3 percent in 1967- 
71, and -6  percent in 1972-75.24 
The majority of  these credits were allocated to manufacturing firms 
producing for export. Hong estimates that the subsidy element implicit in 
these loans rose sharply after 1970, going from about 8 percent of  net 
capital stock in 1969 to about 35 percent by 1975. In addition, the Bank of 
Korea allocated rights to domestic firms to borrow abroad. Since the 
international interest rate was below the domestic rate of  inflation, a 
significant subsidy element was involved in those loans as well.= Hong 
estimates that the implicit subsidy entailed  in foreign borrowing was 
about 6 percent of net capital stock in 1970 and rose to 11 percent in 1975. 
Most of  these implicit subsidies went to the manufacturing sector. 
Hong calculated the real rate of return to capital (including subsidy) for 
different sectors of the economy and found that for manufacturing it rose 
from about 12 percent in 1954-61 to 17 percent in the early 1960s, 26 
percent in the late 1960s, and 27 percent in the early 1970s. This con- 
trasted with a real economywide rate of  return in all nonprimary sectors 
combined of about 15 percent for the period 1967-75.  He concluded that 
“this striking increase implies that the use of large amounts of  domestic 
and foreign borrowed capital at low interest rates has yielded extremely 
high rates of  return on equity investment in Korean industries” (Hong 
1981, p. 374). 
Some puzzles remain with regard to the Korean case. The real wage 
rose rapidly during the period when low-interest loans were apparently 
an inducement to use capital-intensive techniques. Since there was rela- 
tively full employment, this implies that some other sector or sectors of 
the economy were facing higher capital costs than they otherwise would 
have incurred. But Hong’s analysis does not extend into the question of 
which sectors were relatively capital-short. If  there were such sectors, the 
argument must be made that under optimal capital pricing the real wage 
would have risen even faster than it in fact did during the early 1970s. 
That it already rose very rapidly lends some credence to the view that low 
capital costs may have constituted more a lump-sum subsidy, as discussed 
in section 7.1.2, than an incentive at the margin. 
The point remains that, in the Korean case, and presumably in other 
instances where exchange rate overvaluation and import licensing cannot 
be used to confer protection upon industries the government wishes to 
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the same effects. To the extent that those means are used to encourage 
exporting industries, they are likely to reduce the costs for the exporting 
firms of  employing capital-intensive techniques. 
7.2.9  Thailand 
Recall that the Thai economy’s trade orientation was mildly toward 
import  substitution  in  the  early  1970s, although  the  exchange  rate 
appears to have been set at a fairly realistic level. There were a number of 
domestic policies that influenced the cost of capital and rates of return to 
different  firms, and these policies were undoubtedly  directed toward 
firms in import substitution industries in lines deemed most desirable by 
the government. To that extent, domestic policies were utilized in sup- 
port of  the trade regime,  although  administrative decisions on these 
measures were taken largely ad hoc. 
Within the trade regime itself, the fact that the exchange rate was fairly 
realistic  removed  any distortion  arising from  that  source.  However, 
duties on imported  capital equipment were  substantially lower than 
duties on other types of imports, and so on that account there was some 
discrimination in favor of the use of imported capital equipment. Akra- 
sanee was unable to provide quantitative estimates of  the magnitude of 
the differential in duties actually paid. However, he judged that, though 
some distortion was entailed, it was probably quantitatively rather small 
when contrasted to that in other countries. 
Tax exemptions, and especially tax holidays for firms the government 
wished to encourage, appear to have been the largest single factor in- 
fluencing  the cost of capital in Thailand. Some industries, such as textiles, 
chemicals, iron and steel, and motor vehicles, were important recipients 
of these tax holidays in the early 1970s. The same firms that were eligible 
for duty-free import of  capital goods were generally also entitled to the 
tax holiday privileges, again illustrating the link between domestic and 
trade policies. 
Akrasanee did not provide any estimate of the quantitative importance 
of  tax holidays or duty exemption. He did, however, note that credit 
rationing was not a significant factor in the Thai context. With relatively 
low rates of  inflation, interest rates ranged from 10.5 percent for “big 
regular customers” to 14 percent for small-scale firms. He was unable to 
find any difference in bank treatment or loan terms according to industry 
or trade orientation. 
No minimum wage legislation was introduced in Thailand until 1973, 
and there have been no other significant government interventions. Any 
labor market imperfections in the early 1970s therefore arose from the 
presence of  unions or other private-sector phenomena. 
Attempts to estimate earnings functions have been frustrated by the 
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industries. Indeed, the only piece of information available that might be 
related to skill composition (aside from industry itself) was the male/ 
female ratios among employees within each industry. Recognizing that 
the male/female variable might represent a proxy for skills, given the 
absence of  any other variable, Akrasanee  reported  on work he  and 
Chutikul had done in attempting to analyze wage determination in Thai- 
land. They found considerable explanatory power in the male/female 
variable, and also in average firm size and unionization of the industry. 
Because of data limitations, these results are suggestive only, and they 
indicate the need for further research. While the evidence suggests that 
unions and other factors may have had an influence on wage structure, 
that influence does not appear to be pronounced. 
7.2.10  Tunisia 
Tunisia’s economy appears to have had as many factor market distor- 
tions as any other country covered in the project.26  The cost of capital was 
affected by credit rationing, by  other domestic measures, and by  the 
trade regime. In general, capital goods imports were usually permitted, 
so that all who wished to import capital goods could do so at approxi- 
mately  the same price:  there was  no  difference in  price to different 
sectors.” The question then is: By  how much was the exchange rate 
overvalued, and to what extent did the tariff differentiate between im- 
ports of capital goods and of  other commodities? EERs for foods were 
estimated by  Nabli  to have  been  about 28  percent  above those  for 
industrial equipment, and consumer manufactures were subject to rates 
estimated to be about 18 percent higher. In addition, there were fewer 
quantitative restrictions on imports of capital equipment than there were 
for other categories. 
Nabli estimated that the premium on import licenses for foods and 
manufactures of  consumer goods was probably on the order of  25 per- 
cent. Combining these estimates with Blake’s estimate, that currency 
overvaluation was on the order of 20-40 percent in 1969, Nabli concluded 
that 50 percent was probably the upper bound on the extent to which 
currency overvaluation and differential tariff (and licensing) treatment 
lowered the price of  imported capital equipment. His own preferred 
estimate is that there was probably about a 30 percent implicit subsidy 
entailed in the price paid for imported capital equipment (Nabli 1981, 
pp. 467-68). 
Interest rates in Tunisia were quite low, and Nabli estimates that the 
real interest rate paid by borrowers was never above 4 percent, compared 
with a “conservative” estimate that a realistic rate would have been at 
least 10 percent. Credit was therefore strictly rationed, and the details of 
the lending pattern clearly affected resource allocation and choice of 
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able access to cheap loans in Tunisia, Nabli identified public-sector firms 
as the most favored recipients.  Within the private sector, there was 
apparently considerable variability in  access to credit, depending on 
“personal relations, nonmarket phenomena, and government policy” 
(Nabli 1981, p. 468). Nabli “conjectured” that large firms, on average, 
probably had somewhat better chances of  obtaining loans than smaller 
firms. 
Data on worker characteristics and earnings were better for Tunisia 
than for any other country covered by the project. Even here there were 
significant omissions, since no data on education, age, or experience 
variables were available. However, a breakdown was available of  the 
labor force by industry, by skill category (skilled, unskilled, etc.), and by 
type of sector in which employed. Hoping that the skill categories would 
sufficiently reflect the “human capital” component of  earnings, Nabli 
used regression analysis to assess the influence of  other factors-size  of 
employer, monopolistic versus nonmonopolistic sector, private versus 
public-n  wages in Tunisia. 
Here wage payments included a social insurance contribution, which 
constituted between 15 and 25 percent of compensation in the covered 
sectors. Two skill variables-the  proportion of  white-collar employees 
and the proportion of  skilled and semiskilled workereand a variable 
reflecting the proportion of  female labor were used as explanatory vari- 
ables, along with dummy variables reflecting structural characteristics of 
the industry. From the analysis, Nabli concluded that: 
1. The skill composition of the labor force explains a significant part 
of interindustry wage differentials. 
2.  There is some evidence, though not very strong, that female labor 
is paid less than male labor, but it cannot be determined whether this is 
due to sex discrimination or male/female productivity and skill differ- 
ences. 
3. The labor market may be categorized in three ways. 
a.  The  nonmonopolistic  private  component,  exhibiting  the 
smallest degree of  distortions in the labor market, with the largest 
share of  interindustry wage differentials explained by  skill differen- 
tials. 
b. The public sector, which exhibits a higher degree of  wage 
variation that is not explainable by skills. The evidence is also that the 
public sector pays higher wages for unskilled labor. 
c.  The monopolistic private component, which exhibits a highly 
variable wage structure that is not explainable by skill differentials and 
that pays very high average wage rates. [Nabli 1981, pp. 466-671 
Thus, subject to the qualifications concerning data adequacy and reliabil- 
ity, the evidence for Tunisia suggests that the wage structure, although 
partly reflecting differences in workers’ skills, also was significantly in- 144  Chapter Seven 
fluenced by  other factors. Industrial structure and the practices of  the 
public sector appear to have been the most significant influence upon 
wage payments to workers, with unskilled workers receiving about 20 
percent more than their earnings in the rest of  the economy. 
7.2.11  Uruguay 
Uruguay’s system of domestic and trade controls was so complex that 
quantifying the effect of  their influence upon incentives for choice of 
capital intensity is impossible. It seems clear that the exchange rate was 
substantially overvalued, though the rate of inflation was so high that the 
degree of  overvaluation differed from month to month. The situation 
appears to be similar to that in Argentina. Tariffs were exceptionally high 
for virtually all categories of imports, implying that capital goods imports 
were not permitted when domestically produced substitutes were avail- 
able.  Even  for  nonelectrical  and  electrical machinery,  Bension  and 
Caumont estimate that ERPs were 55 and 591 percent respectively. 
These figures, combined with knowledge about the degree of  currency 
overvaluation, suggest that the effective price of  capital goods to any 
given user depended very specifically on the extent to which the types of 
equipment he wished to purchase were produced domestically, the tariff 
rate to which he would be subject, and the date at which he wished to 
invest. Thus, while the trade regime undoubtedly affected the cost of 
capital  equipment , no  single  quantitative  characterization  of  it  is 
possible. 
Given the difficulty of collecting estimates of effective rates of protec- 
tion and labor coefficients in Uruguay, it was not possible to analyze 
sources of  differences in wage payments. A major difficulty was that, in 
the year for which data on nominal payments were available, 1968, the 
rate of  inflation was over 60 percent. Consequently, a substantial part of 
differences in wage payments might have reflected nothing other than 
differences in timing of dates for nominal wage adjustments throughout 
the year. 
7.3  Total Effect on Wagemental Ratios 
It is always difficult to generalize from the experience of  a limited 
number of countries, and it is more difficult here because several authors 
were unable to quantify some or all of  the influences impinging upon 
labor and capital costs. Nonetheless, in light of  the importance of  the 
subject and the paucity of  evidence available, it is worth attempting a 
preliminary assessment of the findings. The influence of the trade regime, 
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are considered in turn. Thereafter there is a preliminary assessment of 
their relative importance. 
7.3.1  Trade Regime 
Exchange rate overvaluation, coupled with the reluctance of  policy- 
makers to tax imports of  capital goods heavily, has been a significant 
factor in  contributing  to low  capital costs under  import substitution 
regimes. There are five countries where authors were able to estimate the 
order of magnitude involved under import substitution-Argentina,  Bra- 
zil (in the 1950s), Chile, Pakistan, and Tunisia. In all cases the authors 
believed that currency overvaluation, combined with low rates of protec- 
tion on imports of capital goods contrasted with tariffs on other commod- 
ities, led to significant undervaluation of  imports of  producer goods. In 
Chile and Tunisia, imports of  capital goods appear to have been fairly 
freely permitted, whereas in Argentina and Pakistan licensing was an 
important component of the system. Interestingly enough, in all cases the 
authors’ estimates of the order of magnitude of the subsidy from the trade 
regime implicit in the pricing of capital goods were in the range of 30-40 
percent, by no means a negligible amount. It is likely that in Indonesia 
before 1965, and in Uruguay, orders of magnitude were no smaller, and 
they may have been larger. In the absence of  controls over imports of 
capital goods through licensing procedures, the question remains of what 
sectors were discriminated against when importation of  capital equip- 
ment was permitted at such overvalued exchange rates and low tariffs. It 
seems doubtful whether, in countries such as Chile and Tunisia, the 
ability to import capital goods at low prices was so frequently exercised 
that the volume of imported capital equipment exceeded what it would 
have been at a realistic exchange rate with uniform EERs for all transac- 
tions. 
It seems reasonable to conclude, therefore, that overvalued exchange 
rates have, in many import substitution countries, provided greater-than- 
optimal incentives for importing  capital goods.  This result  does not 
appear to have been an inevitable concomitant of the import substitution 
strategy. It came about because policymakers failed to impose sufficiently 
high duties on imports of capital equipment to offset the overvaluation of 
the currency. In that sense part of the low cost of capital equipment that 
has characterized import substitution regimes has not been an integral 
part of  the strategy, but rather a by-product of  the unwillingness or 
inability of the authorities to impose offsetting tariffs or other charges on 
importation of  capital goods. 
When it comes to export promotion, the picture is different. There the 
currency has been fairly realistically valued, so that little opportunity for 
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tended to be that domestic incentives, such as low-interest loans, are 
accorded to exporting industries. 
7.3.2  Domestic Capital Costs 
In contrast to trade regimes, under which import substitution countries 
have lowered costs of  imported  capital equipment more than export 
promotion  countries,  credit rationing,  or at  least  provision of  some 
low-interest loans, has been a feature of  almost 
One or more forms of subsidy to the use of capital or imported capital 
equipment were found in  all cases analyzed. The implicit subsidy in- 
volved appears to have been substantial, exceeding the estimated magni- 
tude of  cost reduction associated with currency overvaluation in some 
cases. Even in South Korea, interest subsidies appear to have become a 
distortionary element of  some magnitude, especially in the late 1970s, 
after the period covered by Hong. 
Two additional conclusions emerge. First, in many instances sizable 
reductions in the cost of  using capital equipment were made for firms 
carrying out objectives associated with the trade regime. Thus the Ivory 
Coast’s “priority industry” status, which did provide for access to loans at 
preferential rates and tax exemptions, was a means whereby the author- 
ities could induce production of the types of  commodities they wished. 
Likewise, Brazil’s BNDE loans seem to have been destined largely for 
some of the sectors associated with her export promotion drive. These 
and other examples provide yet another strong indication that one cannot 
divorce analysis of the trade regime and its effects from consideration of 
conditions in domestic markets. 
Second, low-interest loans and currency overvaluation are in many 
ways substitutes insofar as they affect the cost of using imported capital 
equipment. In some cases, such as in Pakistan, they interact to provide 
very large reductions in cost. In principle, however, either an overvalued 
exchange rate or availability of  credit at below-market borrowing rates 
can provide strong incentives for use of  capital-intensive techniques. 
7.3.3  Labor Market Distortions 
A first, and perhaps most important, conclusion to be drawn from 
evaluation of the individual country results is how little is known about 
conditions in labor markets in LDCs. In part this is because the data 
requirements for satisfactory analysis of these phenomena are inherently 
heavy, and definitive data sets are hard to come by. Nonetheless it is clear 
that further research on determinants of wage structure is called for, and 
that the results  would substantially enhance our  understanding  of  a 
number of  important phenomena in developing countries. 
A second conclusion, necessarily considerably more impressionistic 
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market distortions appears to be considerably smaller than might have 
been anticipated and that, in particular, mispricing of  capital goods and 
capital services seems to be proportionately considerably larger than 
mispricing of  labor and labor services. 
The most frequently encountered intervention in labor markets that 
prevents  competitive  wage  determination is the imposition  of  social 
insurance payments and other charges upon the employment of  labor, 
which large firms in the formal sector are obliged to pay but those in the 
informal sector are able to avoid. That pattern appears to hold in Argen- 
tina, Brazil, Colombia, the Ivory Coast (in combination with minimum 
wage legislation), and perhaps Thailand. The same type of differential in 
unskilled wages arises in Tunisia between government enterprises and 
small-scale employers, in which the same factors play an important role. 
At least until the early 1970s, the effect of these regulations appears to 
have been restricted to the formal sector and unskilled labor. If  one is 
focusing upon the effect of alternative trade strategies upon employment, 
however, it is precisely the unskilled workers, and the ability of firms and 
industries using them intensively to compete on international markets, 
that must be the focus of  analysis. It is perhaps noteworthy that both 
Brazil and Korea, during their periods of  rapid export growth, had few 
interventions with wage determination and that, in the Brazilian case, 
those that existed appear to have diminished considerably in importance 
over the period. Likewise, the countries where there are sizable differ- 
ences in labor coefficients according to trade categories-notably  In- 
donesia, Pakistan, and Thailand to a lesser extent-are  countries where 
there has not been, at least during the period covered by the analysis, any 
significant degree of  intervention with wage determination for unskilled 
workers. 
7.4  Conclusion: Total Size of Factor Cost Distortions 
Again recalling that the estimates only indicate orders of  magnitude 
and fail to convey the variability in costs across firms and industries, it is 
possible  to  attempt overall  quantitative estimates.  The evidence  re- 
viewed above can be assembled to provide estimates of  the degree to 
which wagehental ratios diverged from those that would have prevailed 
under well-functioning factor markets. 
Table 7.1 provides the data, based on the preceding discussion. The 
numbers would have greater comparability if one could provide estimates 
of  the variance of these cost-increasing and cost-reducing distortions, as 
well as their mean, but it is not possible to do  so. The comparability across 
countries is therefore extremely limited. For example, Nogues estimated 
that the reduction in costs of capital owing to the trade regime in Argen- 
tina when all capital goods were imported was on the order of  40 per- 148  Chapter Seven 
cent-remarkably  close to the estimates from Chile, Pakistan, and Tuni- 
sia (as well as Brazil in her import substitution period). However, for 
Argentine firms there was an offset in that domestically produced capital 
goods cost more than imported ones would have at equilibrium. Thus the 
average 8 percent figure calculated by Nogues represents what the net 
effect would be on a manufacturing firm employing imported and domes- 
tic capital goods in the proportions used by the sector as a whole. In 
reality there were undoubtedly firms importing almost all their capital 
equipment, and others relying almost entirely on domestic capital goods. 
Whether Argentina’s 8 percent average increase in capital cost owing to 
the trade regime represents more or less of a distortion given the presence 
of  the import substitution industries producing domestic capital goods 
than the 38 percent reduction in Pakistan, where almost all capital goods 
were imported (and where, therefore, the reduction was probably rela- 
tively uniform and across the board), is an open question. 
Before we examine the data in table 7.1, one other preliminary com- 
ment is in order. That is, it is clear in theory that the presence of  a 
distortion affects the wagehental ratio in all sectors of  the economy. If, 
for example, one sector has a tax imposed upon the utilization of  a 
particular factor of  production, the return to that factor of production 
and all others will be affected, both in the tax-affected sector and in the 
rest of  the economy. It is well known that there are conditions under 
which raising the price of, for example, labor to a particular sector can 
lower the real wage to workers in both  In the empirical esti- 
mates that follow, no account is taken of  this phenomenon, and it is 
assumed’  that the wagehental ratio in  the sectors not  subject to any 
distortions is unaffected by their presence elsewhere in the economy. In a 
sense, the estimates of the magnitude of distortions presented here are 
really an estimate of  the differential in relative factor prices between 
sectors subject to distortions and sectors not subject to distortions. 
There are conditions under which such an estimate might also reflect 
the absolute deviation in the wagehental ratio in  the affected sectors 
contrasted to what the ratio would be in equilibrium, but those conditions 
are rather stringent. Suppose, for example, that capital were perfectly 
mobile internationally, so that the country under consideration faced a 
given rental rate for the use of  capital services. If, further, there were an 
Arthur-Lewis-like perfectly elastic supply of labor for the affected indus- 
tries (either because there were a large supply of rural workers willing to 
migrate to the cities or because the affected sectors were a small enough 
fraction of the entire economy), then the estimates would also reflect the 
degree to which distortions altered the wagehental ratio for the affected 
sectors away from their general equilibrium level. In the context of  the 
countries under study, those assumptions are undoubtedly too stringent. 
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affected by the distortions surely varied from country to country and over 
time. 
Turning then to the data in table 7.1, it is apparent that labor market 
factors,  the trade regime, credit rationing, and tax systems all contributed 
to raising the wagehental ratio for firms subject to them. There is no 
single  pattern  of  relative  importance  among these  factors,  however. 
Pakistan, which appears to have the highest degree of  implicit subsidiza- 
tion to the use of  capital-intensive techniques, has (or, more accurately, 
had) a relatively free labor market. Tunisia, by contrast, appears to have 
had factors leading to cost differentials of  virtually all types, as did the 
Ivory Coast. Yet the rank order of the estimated magnitude of distortion 
seems to be independent of the number of  different types of distortions 
identified. Thus Nogues was able to quantify labor market interventions 
of  several types as well as trade regime and credit rationing influences 
upon capital costs. Yet his estimates for Argentina fall far below Nabli’s 
estimates for Tunisia, where the same pattern of  pervasive distortion 
seems to have existed. 
What does seem clear, even from these impressionistic data, is that the 
exporting countries-Hong  Kong, South Korea, Brazil, and to a lesser 
extent the Ivory Coast-had  relatively  lower  levels  of  factor market 
distortions than did the import substitution countries, with the possible 
exception of  Argentina. Even there, the Argentine data perhaps repre- 
sent more of  an average among highly subsidized and unsubsidized firms: 
Nogues estimated that, under certain assumptions, the wagehental ratio 
in the modern sector might be as much as eight times that in the tradi- 
tional sector. 
A second conclusion probably not unrelated to the first is that currency 
overvaluation  and favorable treatment of  capital goods imports were 
potent sources of  lowering the costs of capital utilization for firms eligible 
to import. For Argentina, Chile, Pakistan, and Tunisia, as well as Brazil 
in her import substitution days, this source of  underpricing  of  capital 
goods was judged to be important. 
Credit rationing at subsidized interest rates is estimated by Hong and 
Guisinger to have constituted a major source of  underpricing of capital 
services. Finally, social insurance taxes have driven a wedge, again of 
about 20-30  percent, in the price of  labor between firms and sectors 
subject to the taxes and other activities within the economy. 
Each of  these sources of pricing disparity between firms and sectors by 
itself could significantly have affected incentives, but together the effects 
may have been fairly powerful. All of them work in the same direction, to 
induce lower capital costs and higher labor costs than would be chosen at 
appropriate shadow prices. 
Moreover, insofar as the factor proportions model of trade developed 
in chapter 4 explains comparative advantage,  at least for HOS  goods, one Table 7.1  Percentage Distortions in Labor and Capital Costs from Various Sources 
Percentage Reduction in 
Capital Costs Owing to  Percentage 
Percentage  Increase in 
Increase in  Trade  Credit  Wage/Rental 
Country  Period  Labor Costs  Regime  Rationing  Other  Total  Ratio 
Argentina  1973  15  8  9  n.a.  17  38 
Brazil  1968  27  0  4  n.a.  4  31 
Chile  1966-68  n.a.  37  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Hong Kong  1973  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Ivory Coast  1971  23  0  3"  12"  15  45 
Pakistan  196  1-64  0  38  53  10  76  316 
South Korea  1969  0  0  8  2  10  11 
Tunisia  1972  20  30  6  n.a.  36  87 
Note:  No quantitative estimates are available for Colombia, Indonesia, Thailand, or Uruguay. 
"Estimates based on differentials given in Monson 1981, table 6.15 and are reproduced in section 7.2.6. 151  The Extent of  Factor Market Distortions 
cannot help but question the extent to which distortions of  the order of 
magnitude reported by the country authors may have “wiped out” what- 
ever comparative advantage there may have been. 
This, of  course, raises a fundamental empirical question, about which 
there is little information to date. That is, How large are the differentials 
in “natural” wagehental ratios that would be observed under an efficient 
allocation of world resources? If, in fact, Pakistan’s optimal wagehental 
ratio is one-fiftieth that of  her major trading partners, then the circum- 
stance that trade and domestic policies distorted that ratio by a factor of 
four need not have significantly adversely affected her potential pattern 
of commodity trade. If, on the other hand, the optimal wagehental ratio 
in Pakistan were one-fifth that of  her major trading partners, distortions 
of  the order of  magnitude estimated by  Guisinger would  have had  a 
severe impact on the potential for gains from trade. Moreover, if  there 
were “neighboring” countries in the chain of comparative advantage with 
fewer distortions in factor markets than Pakistan, one can again imagine 
that distortions within Pakistan could have adversely affected the scope 
for profitable (and economic) expansion of exports. 
Of  necessity, these questions must remain unanswered  at this stage. 
One can estimate the extent to which distortions of  the magnitude re- 
ported in the country studies might have affected factor proportions, and 
that is undertaken in chapter 8. 
At this juncture two other observations are in order, although again 
qualifications must be made in view of  the very limited data available. 
The first concerns the prevalence of  “informal” markets and their rela- 
tion to factor‘ market imperfections, while the second focuses upon the 
link between wage distortions and the country authors’ findings concern- 
ing the skill intensity of  trade. 
A frequent feature of  developing countries’ economies, as noted in 
chapter 2, is the presence of  a sizable informal sector, which generally 
consists of  small shopkeepers, service personnel, and even fabricating 
facilities that are generally de facto exempt from the social insurance 
taxes, sales taxes, and other regulations that govern economic activity 
among larger firms. Those small-scale activities are also generally less 
favored than large firms in access to low-interest loans and to import 
licenses, and factor proportions differ drastically between the two sectors 
of  the economy within, as well as between, lines of  economic activity. 
Evidence on the degree to which social insurance charges, and interven- 
tions in the capital and credit markets, can affect relative input costs 
certainly suggests that the sharp dichotomy between the behavior of  the 
informal sector and that of the formal sector may itself be the outcome of 
distortions imposed by government policies. To the extent this is so, it 
would significantly affect analysis of  developing countries and interpreta- 
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The second  conjecture-focusing  upon skills-pertains  to the fre- 
quency with  which  minimum  wage  legislation was  observed  but was 
deemed not to be effective,  except perhaps for unskilled workers.  In 
cases where minimum wage legislation is binding, there is likely to be a 
bias within the system toward hiring more highly skilled workers: if  the 
wage must be paid anyway, and more-qualified workers are available, it 
will pay to substitute skill-using techniques for processes using unskilled 
labor. It may perhaps be coincidence, but the country findings regarding 
utilization of  skilled labor seemed to yield much more pronounced dif- 
ferentials than did their  results pertaining to unskilled  labor. To the 
extent that wage determination for skilled workers was free of  distortion, 
while that for unskilled workers was affected by minimum wage require- 
ments, it is at least possible  that the observed systematic differences 
between trade categories and skill intensity arose because of the clearer 
incentive signals confronting entrepreneurs in their choice of  skill cate- 
gories than in their intensity  of  utilization of  unskilled labor. To the 
extent that wage  differentials appropriately  reflected  the scarcity  of 
skilled  the comparative disadvantage of the project countries 
in skilled labor-intensive commodities might have been expected to  show 
up more clearly than their comparative advantage in use of  unskilled 
labor. While this must remain only a conjecture, it nonetheless suggests 
that minimum  wage  legislation  may  adversely  affect  employment  of 
unskilled workers-precisely  the group presumably being helped by it. 